overly concerned about the situation: Murphy's role was to be that of an observer. He was told 'to see what it was all about' and 'just go over and hold the fort'. Murphy did not get more specific instructions until Dulles returned to the State Department, and cabled Murphy on 30 July 1956. Dulles agreed with the President that force was only acceptable as a last resort, and only after all peaceful means had been exhausted. Declaration of war was the prerogative of Congress, which Dulles doubted would be forthcoming, if traffic was allowed to pass unmolested through the Canal. 2 Dulles then outlined three courses of action to which he wanted Murphy to get allied agreement 1 There needed to be general acceptance of an international conference. 2 This was to be delayed as long as possible. Dulles wanted an international conference because he expected Nasser to turn down an ultimatum and thus give the allies an excuse to use military force. But as force was unacceptable to the US administration, other means to solve the crisis had to be found. If Nasser refused reasonable proposals coming out of an international conference, 'then there would be a broader basis than now exists for other affirmative action, free of the imputation, however false in fact, that we were backing [the] French and [the] British for purposes not directly related to the operation of [the] Canal'. Only under such circumstances could the allies expect positive action from Congress. Thus Dulles was playing for time, delaying the calling of the conference and dragging out the negotiations, in order to defuse a potentially explosive situation. This is perhaps the key issue in the Suez crisis between the United States and Britain and France. 3 Finally, Murphy had to prevent the issue of the nationalization of the Canal from being referred to the United Nations because of the unpleasant consequences it could cause for the American position on the Panama Canal. As Dulles explained to Murphy: '[W]e must consider our own position in [the] Panama Canal which depends upon a treaty, and we would be unwilling to be party to a procedure which assumed that the United Nations had authority in such matters which would override treaty rights'. 3 Murphy had limited success in 'holding the fort' and became thoroughly alarmed by belligerent British politicians. Macmillan in particular convinced the American envoy that military action was imminent. Eisenhower believed that Murphy could no longer control
